Inclusionary Discrimination: Pigmentocracy and Patriotism in the Dominican Republic

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This study explored the nature of racial hierarchy and the connection between racial identity and Dominican patriotism using a questionnaire given to an in situ sample in the Dominican Republic. The analyses compared the contradictory expectations of the "racial democracy" (or "Iberian exceptionalism") thesis and social dominance theory. Results showed that despite the very high level of racial intermarriage in the Dominican Republic, there was strong evidence of a "pigmentocracy," or group-based social hierarchy based largely on skin color. Furthermore, despite a slight tendency for people to give slightly higher status ratings to their own "racial" category than were given to them by members of other "racial" categories, this pigmentocracy was highly consensual across the racial hierarchy. These results were consistent with the expectations of social dominance theory. However, in contrast to similar analyses in the United States and Israel, these Dominican findings showed no evidence that members of different "racial" categories had different levels of patriotic attachment to the nation. Also in contrast to recent American findings, there was no evidence that Dominican patriotism was positively associated with anti-black racism, social dominance orientation, negative affect toward other racial groups, or ethnocentrism, regardless of the "racial" category one belonged to. These latter results were consistent with the racial democracy thesis. The theoretical implications of these somewhat conflicting findings are discussed.

KEY WORDS: patriotism, SDO, racism, identity

A casual glance around the world cannot but impress one with the spectacle of continuous and ferocious interethnic and inter-"racial" conflict in the post-communist era. Despite strenuous, at times even brutal, efforts at ethnic and "racial" assimilation (e.g., Kinnane-Roelofsma, 1998), it seems clear that ethnicity and "race" remain highly salient social identities that show no sign of being given up any time soon. Given this reality, one of the important issues then becomes trying to understand how these various ethnic and "racial" subidentities can be

united with commitment to, and identification with, larger national and even transnational social identities.

Because of this seemingly chronic interethnic tension within the context of large, complex, and multiethnic states (e.g., Bosnia, Rwanda, Spain, Germany, Russia, the United States), a number of social scientists have recently begun to focus specifically on the interface between ethnic and national attachment (see, e.g., Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994; Citrin, Wong, & Duff, in press; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2000; de la Garza, Falcon, & Garcia, 1996; Hofstetter, Feierabend, & Klicperova-Baker, 1999; Lambert, Mermigis, & Taylor, 1986; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Sidanius & Petrocik, in press; Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin, 1998). Two aspects of the interface between ethnic and national attachment have been the primary focus of some of this recent research. First is the question of whether members of different ethnic and "racial" communities are equally committed to, and equally identify with, their superordinate identities as citizens of the nation as a whole. Thus, one wonders whether African Americans regard themselves to be as "American" as whites, whether a Hausa can be as committed a "Nigerian" as an Ibo, or whether a Jew in Russia can be as committed and patriotic a Russian as a non-Jew.

The second aspect of the interface between ethnic and national attachment concerns the manner in which attachment to one's ethnic/racial identity covaries with one's attachment to the nation-state as a whole. This question seems especially relevant in light of contemporary debates concerning the potentially harmful consequences of "multiculturalism" and "ethnic pluralism." Some have argued that strong and salient loyalties to subgroups are inherently at odds with a sense of common national attachment (see, e.g., Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997). For example, Arthur Schlesinger (1992), one of the foremost opponents of multiculturalism in the United States, argued that when multiculturalism implies that ethnicity becomes a defining feature of one's social identity, "then multiculturalism not only betrays history but undermines the theory of America as one people" (pp. 13–14). At the same time, critics have responded by analyzing the history of nation-building and national consciousness and concluding that any attempt to construct "one people" involves marginalizing some (Chaterjee, 1993).

The nexus of national identity and racial and ethnic hierarchy forms durable and intractable structures of inequality, in turn creating open invitations for political elites at the national or local level to manipulate these differences and perceptions in ways that can often lead to violence (e.g., the former Yugoslavia). Thus, one wonders whether societies with histories of racialized slavery have stable and durable perceived hierarchies that last long past the end of slavery as an institution. A related question is whether the previous or current subordinate groups are as attached to the nation as are members of high-status groups, or instead have been further marginalized and had opportunities denied to them as the result of the concept of a unified nation. There are some arguments that such societies exist within the former colonies of Portugal and Spain in the New World.

One area of the world where claims of "racial democracy" and relative racial egalitarianism have often been made is Latin America and the Caribbean. Some prominent scholars of Latin American societies have argued that, in contrast to the ferociously racist and essentially dichotomous nature of race relations in the United States, race relations in Latin America and the Caribbean were substantially less oppressive, brutal, and dichotomous. This position is widely known as the *Iberian exceptionalism* or *racial democracy* thesis (see, e.g., Degler, 1971; Freyre, 1946, 1951; Hoetink, 1967; Pierson, 1942; Tannenbaum, 1947).[1]

Four possible explanations for the emergence of Iberian exceptionalism have been offered. First is the presumed inclusionary effect of Catholicism (see, e.g., Tannenbaum, 1947). In this view, although the Catholic Church did not proscribe slavery, its theology nonetheless regarded the slave as a creature with a soul and therefore beloved of God, whereas the theological tendency in North America has been to view African slaves as essentially subhuman and little more than property (see, e.g., *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 1857). Second, unlike the situation for Northern Europeans, the Europeans of the Iberian Peninsula had the experience of being ruled by dark-skinned people (i.e., the Moors) for almost 700 years (718 to 1402 A.D.). The Moors were considered in many ways the moral and cultural superiors of the white-skinned people they controlled. Therefore, the experience of being subordinated to the Moors made it difficult for Iberians to regard dark-skinned people as subhuman with the same degree of alacrity as Northern Europeans found possible. Third, economic and social conditions in Latin America allowed for the manumission of black slaves at significantly higher rates than in North America (Harris, 1974). Finally, because many of the first Iberians in the new world were men without intact families, they soon formed long-term sexual-emotional relationships with both Native American and African slave women. These relationships soon resulted in relatively large mulatto and mestizo populations across much of Latin America and the Caribbean (Degler, 1986; Wade, 1997).

The Iberian exceptionalism thesis suggests that after slavery ended, race ceased to be a salient social division within these countries (Freyre, 1951). This perspective categorically denies the existence of any racism and defines the national character as racially egalitarian. Social division and stratification are suggested to be based on class, with little or no correlation between race and class. In many countries, the idea of a mestizo population (or the ideology of *mestizaje*) is that because all are of mixed heritage, it is impossible to clearly identify races or practice racism (Pierson, 1942). The sheer number of categories and the recognition of widespread miscegenation, in contrast to the United States, is argued to make sharp racial division—and, by extension, racism—impossible (Nobles, 2000). Indeed, countries like Brazil not only have had the Iberian exceptionalism thesis thrust upon them by outside researchers, but have embraced it as a central

[1] See Hanchard (1994) for a more comprehensive critique of the racial democracy thesis.

and positive feature of their national identity in explicit contrast to the United States.

This thesis has come under attack in recent scholarship (e.g., Hanchard, 1994; Marx, 1998; Nobles, 2000; Wade, 1997). Nonetheless, there is clearly something "different" about racial politics in the former Iberian colonies, as evidenced by the general absence of post-manumission Jim Crow laws and de jure apartheid in Latin America and the Caribbean, the relative infrequency of race-based collective violence (e.g., race riots, lynching, pogroms, and "hate crimes"), and the high level of miscegenation found in Latin America versus the United States (see Degler, 1986). But even if we accept the idea that there may be something different about Iberian-style race relations and discourse in comparison to the United States, this still does not mean that systematic racism in Latin America and the Caribbean is non-existent.

The critics of Iberian exceptionalism have argued that the theorized absence of racism in Latin America and the Caribbean is based on a comparison with the United States before the North American civil rights revolution. They also suggest that Iberian exceptionalism ignores the practice of exclusion and public policies that have regularly granted greater resources to whites and have encouraged white immigration based on a concept of "whitening" the population. They observe that little was done to help the former slaves to integrate into free societies, whereas substantial state benefits were at times offered to European and Asian immigrants in order to help "whiten" the population. As Melissa Nobles notes, even those who were aware of the problem thought it would disappear. However, it would not disappear through aid to blacks but through the social fact that blacks would over time cease to exist, racially and culturally, as a result of "whitening" (Nobles, 2000).

In this context, critics of Iberian exceptionalism suggest that perhaps the only glaring difference between Iberian countries and the United States is the "myth of racial democracy" itself. The only differences they point to are the hegemonic and paternalistic ideal that there is no racial problem in Latin America, and the paternalistic ideal that blacks and the nation can improve themselves through whitening. They then argue that, in effect, the only difference is the degree to which the existence of race-based hierarchy is hidden beneath a cloud of pronouncements of racial democracy that obscure everyday inequalities. Thus, the only "exceptional" thing about Iberians is the sleight of hand they use in denying racially based hierarchy and promoting a mythology of equal participation in national history and culture. In response, these largely African American and Afro-Anglo scholars have been attacked for "importing" U.S. paradigms of race relations without paying close attention to the specifics of race relations in Latin America (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1999). Nonetheless, each of these two competing camps acknowledges that there are substantial differences between the United States and Latin America in the manner in which "race" is construed and enacted. The crucial questions concern the extent and nature of these differences.

Given the fact that there is at least some concrete support for the Iberian exceptionalism thesis, Latin America would appear to be a particularly interesting social context in which to study the interface between ethnic and national attachment. Besides Brazil, a common target for the study of "race" in Latin America, the Dominican Republic appears to be at least as interesting a social context in which to study this topic. The Dominican Republic shares a history of racial slavery common to the rest of the Americas, a history of racist discourse (see Howard, 1999; Pons, 1981; Torres-Saillant, 1998a, 1998b, 1999), and a tendency to encase the concept of *Dominicanidad* in distinctly Europhilic and Afrophobic terms (see Torres-Saillant, 1999). However, it is also among the nations with the highest level of miscegenation between people of European and African descent in the Western Hemisphere, even more so than Brazil. Although the Dominican Republic did have an indigenous population of Native Americans (the Taino), this population became essentially extinct as early as 1521.

At the same time, the Dominican Republic has also adopted a rubric of *mestizaje* that claims, despite discourses around whitening, that all races are an equal part of the makeup of the Dominican Republic. This ideology includes arguments that the blood of the indigenous population is a part of the current racial mix on the island, despite the early extermination of the Taino. Although reliable census data are lacking, the best estimates we have suggest that there is much to this assertion. Nonetheless, the current Dominican population consists of those with varying degrees of European and African ancestry. Data compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency indicate a "racial" breakdown showing that 16% of the population is "White," 11% is "Black," and fully 73% is of mixed race (i.e., primarily "White" and "Black"; *World Factbook*, 2000).[2] This degree of miscegenation is so high that many people, including many Dominican political elites, would argue that it represents prima facie evidence for "the end of racism" in this society. Thus, even though the Iberian exceptionalism thesis was originally developed from studies of Brazil (see Freyre, 1951), the very high level of miscegenation in the Dominican Republic suggests that this model can be reasonably applied to this nation as well, and would appear to be an excellent social context in which to further examine the interface between racial and national attachment. At the same time, we must be careful to consider other theoretical options. The charge by researchers who have critiqued the Iberian exceptionalism thesis is that miscegenation is used as both a cause of racial democracy and proof that racial democracy exists. This type of circular reasoning, used by some researchers and political elites, should still make us skeptical and open to other theoretical possibilities.

In contrast, those working within the social dominance perspective (see Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) have argued that the interface between ethnic and national attachment will be of a qualitatively different type

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[2] According to 1999 CIA data, the "racial" breakdown in Brazil is 55% "White," 38% mixed "White" and "Black," 6% "Black," and 1% "other" (see *World Factbook*, 2000).

from that suggested by the Iberian exceptionalism perspective. Social dominance theory argues that human social systems tend to organize themselves as group-based hierarchies. Dominant groups at the top of the social structure enjoy a disproportionate share of positive social value (e.g., power, prestige, employment, good nutrition and health care), whereas subordinate groups at the bottom of the social structure suffer from a disproportionate share of negative social value (e.g., powerlessness, poverty, poor health, imprisonment, premature death). Because social systems are disproportionately controlled by and function in the interests of dominant rather than subordinate groups, social dominance theorists argue that dominants should consequently feel a greater sense of entitlement and prerogative over the nation and the organs of the state.

According to social dominance theory, this greater sense of national entitlement is expected to result in at least three specific kinds of *asymmetry* in the interface between ethnic and national attachment. First, commitment to a superordinate identity is expected to be a function of one's social power and status. In societies that are sharply and severely hierarchically organized, members of dominant groups will generally experience a greater degree of identification with and attachment to the nation than will members of subordinate groups. Second, an asymmetrical relationship is expected between identification with one's ethnic group and attachment to the nation as a whole. Because the nation and the state function disproportionately as instruments for the exercise of dominant group power, the correlation between one's identification with one's ethnic/racial group and attachment to the nation as a whole is expected to be positive among members of dominant groups, but significantly less positive among members of subordinate groups. Among those subordinates at the very bottom of the social hierarchy, this correlation should not only be less positive than that found among dominants, but even *negative*. Third, asymmetrical relationships are also expected between superordinate national attachment and ideologies of group dominance. Thus, among members of dominant groups, attachment to the nation as a whole should be positively associated with exclusionary ideologies such as racism, ethnocentrism, and social dominance orientation. In addition, these relationships should be more positive among dominants than among subordinates. We refer to these ideas collectively as the *asymmetry hypothesis.*[3]

Asymmetrical associations between patriotic attachment to the nation and ideologies of group dominance are not only expected by social dominance theorists, but also have been suggested by several postmodern racism scholars (see, e.g., Anderson, 1991; Chaterjee, 1993; Gilroy, 1994; Marx, 1998; Mills, 1997; Young, 1990). For example, in *Making Race and Nation* (1998), Antony Marx argued that, at least in nations such as the United States and South Africa, a sense of collective

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[3] Note that this asymmetry idea is simply a special case of the larger thesis within social dominance theory entitled "behavioral asymmetry" (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 9).

national attachment among whites was intimately tied to the exclusion of the black populations:

> Analysis of race making may then tell us something more generalizable about the processes and effects of nation-state building through either exclusion or inclusion. Not only have such institutional rules consolidated particular social cleavages, but manipulation of cleavages such as race or ethnicity has also shaped how dominant institutions and loyalty to them were built. Selective exclusion was not tangential to nation-state building, as liberals argue, but was instead central to how social order was maintained. (pp. 2–3)

Thus far, empirical evidence in support of the asymmetry hypothesis has been found in the United States and Israel. Within both nations, the overall level of patriotic commitment to the nation as a whole tends to be significantly greater among dominants (i.e., Euro-Americans in the United States, Israeli Jews in Israel) than among subordinates (i.e., African Americans in the United States, Israeli Arabs in Israel) (Sidanius et al., 1997; Sinclair et al., 1998). In addition, although the correlation between ethnic and national attachment was positive among dominants, this relationship tended to be negative among subordinates. In other words, the more dominants identified with their ethnic/racial subgroups, the more patriotic they felt. In contrast, the more subordinates identified with their ethnic/racial subgroups, the less patriotic they felt.

Among dominants (e.g., Euro-Americans), patriotic and nationalistic attachment to the nation was positively associated with social dominance orientation, anti-black racism, and ethnocentric rejection of subordinates.[4] In contrast, among subordinates, patriotism tended to be negatively associated with social dominance orientation, racism, and ethnocentrism (Sidanius et al., 1997; Sidanius & Peña, 2000; Sinclair et al., 1998). Sidanius and Petrocik (in press) replicated several of these basic findings using large and representative samples of Americans. This replication was particularly consistent in the contrast between white and black Americans. Thus, in both the United States and Israel, among other ways, the asymmetry effect manifests itself as *exclusionary patriotism* (Sidanius & Petrocik, in press). This is to say that patriotic attachment to the nation implies "ethnophilic" reactions toward dominant groups and "ethnophobic" reaction toward subordinate groups. This may well have been the type of exclusionary patriotism that recently swept through the fragments of the former Yugoslavia (see, e.g., Denich, 1993).

As suggested by Sidanius et al. (1997) and Sinclair et al. (1998), the existence of an asymmetrical interface between subordinate (e.g., racial) attachment and superordinate (e.g., national) attachment should depend on the social context. An

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[4] See Sidanius et. al., 1997. There was one exception in this pattern among Israeli Jews in the Sidanius et al. study: The correlation between social dominance orientation and nationalism was positive, whereas the correlation between social dominance orientation and patriotism was negative.

exclusionary, asymmetrical interface between subordinate and superordinate attachment is expected to hold only in those contexts in which there is a clear, unambiguous, and rather severe group-based social hierarchy. In contrast, in those social contexts that can be reasonably described as "group-egalitarian" or "hierarchy-attenuating," there is reason to expect an "Iberian exceptionalist–type" rather than an asymmetrical-type interface between subordinate and superordinate attachment. Indeed, Sinclair et al. (1998) found evidence for the differential effect of social context in a panel study of UCLA undergraduates. Although they found evidence of exclusionary patriotism in the asymmetrical relationship between ethnic and national attachment, there was no such asymmetry in the relationship between ethnic identity and attachment to or identification with the university as a social institution. Sinclair et al. (1998) suggested that the very different kinds of interfaces between ethnic and superordinate identities were a result of the qualitatively different kinds of hierarchical environments these two contexts represented. They suggested that, despite the superficially inclusionary discourse concerning what it means to be "American" (e.g., equality before the law, the "American Creed"), the history of American racial imperialism and the realities of contemporary American life clearly belie these inclusionary and egalitarian discourses. Rather, the facts of American life demonstrate a consistent and relatively ferocious level of group-based inequality and dominance based largely on the social distinctions of "race." In other words, life in American society as a whole could be understood as a relatively "hierarchy-enhancing" social context (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In contrast, given the general and relatively "genuine" commitment to egalitarian values and ethnic inclusion found within certain contexts, such as major and public university campuses (e.g., UCLA), we are dealing with social contexts that could be arguably regarded as relatively "hierarchy-attenuating" (for similar results, see Gurin, Peng, Lopez, & Nagda, 1999; for a slight exception to this inclusionary trend within the university, see Brewer, von Hippel, & Gooden, 1999).

If, indeed, it is the inclusionary and egalitarian nature of the social context that helps to determine whether there will be an asymmetrical interface between subordinate and superordinate attachment, then there is also some reason to expect that in those societies that credibly practice some modicum of "racial democracy," one should also find a pluralist rather than an asymmetrical or exclusionary interface between racial and national attachment.

Therefore, we set out to examine two basic issues in our Dominican Republic study. First, if social dominance theory is correct, the Dominican Republic should manifest a clear, unambiguous, and consensually held "racial hierarchy" despite the very high level of miscegenation and claims of racial democracy or Iberian exceptionalism. Because of the nation's history of racial slavery, there is strong reason to expect that the group-based social hierarchy in the Dominican Republic will be largely defined in terms of one's degree of European versus African heritage. According to this assumption, Dominicans with high proportions of

European ancestry should have relatively high social status and power, while those with relatively high proportions of African heritage should have relatively low social status and power. Because of the largely "race"-based nature of this hierarchy, one's phenotypic European versus African features (e.g., skin color) should serve as the primary criteria for placing individuals into various social status categories along the dominant-subordinate continuum. Thus, this Dominican version of group-based hierarchy should be largely describable as a "pigmentocracy." Moreover, following the logic of social dominance theory, this pigmentocracy is expected to enjoy a high level of social consensus. Whatever one's "racial" status, there should be a high level of agreement as to which "racial" groups have high social status and which groups have low social status.

Second, those using a group dominance perspective (e.g., Blumer, 1961; Jackman, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) should also expect evidence of exclusionary patriotism. Not only should members of high-status "racial" categories have a stronger sense of patriotic attachment to the nation, but there should also be an interaction between racial status and racial identification. Among members of dominant racial categories, racial identification should be positively related to patriotic attachment to the nation, while among members of subordinate racial categories exactly the opposite should be found. Finally, there should also be evidence of a positive association between Dominican patriotism and ideologies of social and group dominance, especially among members of dominant "racial" categories.

On the other hand, if the Iberian exceptionalism/racial democracy thesis is correct, we should find little or no evidence of a consensually held "racial" hierarchy, or pigmentocracy. Second, there should be very little or no evidence of exclusionary patriotism. All "racial" categories should be equally attached to the nation as a whole, and there should be no differential association between Dominican patriotism and ideologies or values of group dominance and ethnocentrism, regardless of one's "racial" categorization.

Method

Respondents and Procedure

We sampled 234 citizens of the Dominican Republic within the capital city, Santo Domingo, during the summer of 1999. Of these respondents, 88 were male, 124 were female, and 22 had missing gender data. The median age was 28 years. To obtain a broad cross-section of respondents from different economic strata, we divided the city of Santo Domingo into five clusters—upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, working class, and poor class—and randomly sampled approximately equal numbers of participants from each of these clusters. The identification of these five regions of the city was based on the consensual opinions of our five native interviewers. The five native interviewers were trained and supervised for

the data collection. The native interviewers went door to door to the randomly selected households and asked the first person answering the door to participate in the study if he or she was at least 18 years old. We had a 93% agreement rate. Each respondent was then interviewed in his or her home. All interviews were conducted in Spanish. After examining the pattern of responses as a function of the interviewer's race, we found no evidence of "race of interviewer" effects.

Derivation of "Racial" Categories

We used a focus group to ascertain the particular "racial" categorization scheme used in the Dominican Republic. The group consisted of six native Dominicans and met on three occasions. These informants disclosed that there were essentially six "racial" categories used in the Dominican Republic: "Blanco," "Trigueño," "Indio," "Mulatto," "Moreno," and "Negro." As a result, the full-scale survey asked respondents to classify themselves into one of these six "racial" categories.

Measures

"Racial" classification was indexed by use of "self-ratings" and "other-ratings." The other-rated classification was based on the interviewers' classification of the respondents into one of the six "racial" categories above. The self-rated classification was defined by asking respondents to place themselves into one of the same six categories. A cross-classification of these other-rated and self-rated indices showed a high degree of consensus across indices [Spearman rank-order $r = .84$; $\chi^2(25) = 288.09$, $p < 10^{-5}$]. The fact that both interviewers and interviewees showed such high agreement in the actual usage of these "racial" categories is evidence of high reliability in the use of these categories. Table I gives the distributions of the respondents into the other-rated and self-rated "racial" categories.

Table I. Distribution of "Races" in the Dominican Sample according to Other-rated and Self-rated "Racial" Classification

"Racial" Classification	Other-rated "Racial" Classifications (%)	Self-rated "Racial" Classifications (%)
Blanco	38.5	31.2
Trigueño	12.4	17.1
Indio	12.4	20.5
Mulatto	12.8	12.4
Moreno	12.8	7.7
Negro	11.1	11.1
Total	100	100

Skin color. We used two different skin color ratings of each respondent: other-rated skin color ratings and self-rated skin color ratings. These were simply the respondents' skin color ratings as judged by the interviewers and by the respondents themselves, respectively. All skin color ratings were made on a 6-point response scale ranging from 1 (very light skin) to 6 (very dark skin). There was a high degree of consensus in these skin color ratings [Spearman rank-order $r = 0.73$, $p < .001; \chi^2(25) = 224.22, p < 10^{-5}$].

Patriotism. Largely on the basis of previous research (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sidanius et al., 1997; Sidanius & Petrocik, in press), we used a four-item measure of patriotism: "I find the sight of the Dominican flag very moving," "Every time I hear the national anthem, I feel strongly moved," "I have great love for my country," and "I am proud to be Dominican." The reliability of this scale was considered adequate ($\alpha = .71$). The rating scale ranged from "1 – strongly disagree" to "6 – strongly agree."

Social dominance orientation (SDO) was measured by use of 10 items from the standard S_6 SDO scale and had a Cronbach's α reliability of .70 (see Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). We used the same rating scale for items as above.

Anti-black racism was measured by four items: "Dark skin Dominicans are less intellectually able than other groups," "Dark skin Dominicans are lazier than other groups," "Haitians are less intellectually able than other groups," and "Haitians are lazier than other groups" ($\alpha = .62$). We used the same rating scale for each item as above. Furthermore, confirmatory factor analysis supported the notion that these four items essentially define a single continuum [adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) = .99]. The construct validity of both the racism and SDO scales within the Dominican context was attested to by the positive, significant, although modest correlation between the two scales (i.e., $r = .39, p < .001$).

Racial identification was measured by three items: "I feel more comfortable with others of my same skin color," "I identify much more with those who have my same skin color," and "I often think about my skin color" ($\alpha = .81$). Each item used the same rating scale as above.

Racial affect was measured by asking how positively or negatively the respondent felt toward each of the major "races" in Dominican society. We used a rating scale ranging from 1 (very positive) to 6 (very negative).

Ethnocentrism was computed as the degree of positive affect felt for one's "racial" ingroup minus the degree of positive affect felt for a given outgroup. Thus, the more positive the number, the greater the degree of ethnocentrism. Thus, each respondent had five separate ethnocentrism indices, one for each separate outgroup (i.e., "racial" ingroup minus "racial" outgroup).

"Racial" status. The respondents were asked to rate the perceived social status of each of the six "racial" categories above: "There are many people who believe that the different ethnic groups enjoy different amounts of social status in this society. You may not believe this yourself, but if you had to rate each of the

following groups as most people see them, how would you do so?" Response alternatives ranged from 1 (very low status) to 6 (very high status).

Socioeconomic status. This measure was defined by asking the respondents to classify themselves into one of five categories: poor, working class, middle class, upper middle class, or upper class.

African Heritage. We asked two questions concerning degree of African heritage. The first concerned the respondent's assessment of the degree of African heritage in his or her own personal background. The second question concerned the degree of African heritage assumed for Dominicans in general. Each response was given on a scale ranging from "1—Very little African heritage" to "6—A great deal of African heritage."

Results

The Issue of Pigmentocracy

Our first substantive question concerns whether there is any evidence of a group-based "racial" hierarchy or pigmentocracy within the Dominican Republic. Given the extremely high level of miscegenation and the thesis of racial democracy, we should find little or no evidence of consensually held racial hierarchy or pigmentocracy in the modern state of the Dominican Republic.

To explore this issue, we first examined the average social status ratings given to each of the six "racial" groups. Contrary to the racial democracy thesis, as can be seen in Figure 1, the different "racial" groups were perceived as having clearly different levels of social status. A one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) disclosed that these perceived status differences were highly significant [$F(5, 1135) = 60.13, p < 10^{-12}$] and relatively strong (i.e., effect size = .46). An inspection of the nature of these social status differences between "racial" groups seems to support the notion of a pigmentocracy. That is, "Blancos" (i.e., whites) were perceived to have the highest level of social status, with progressively darker "racial" categories receiving progressively lower social status ratings. In addition, use of planned comparisons between all adjacent "racial" categories disclosed that there was a statistically significant social status difference between all adjacent groups along the status continuum (see Table II).

Not only were these different "racial" groups perceived as possessing distinctly different levels of social status, but these perceived differences also showed a very high level of consensus across both individuals and "racial" groups. To measure this general level of consensus, we computed the intraclass correlation coefficient of these status ratings across individuals (see Winer, 1971, pp. 288–290). This consensus level was found to be quite high ($r_{intraclass} = .983$). The consensus in social status ratings was also quite strong across the social status continuum. Hence, the relative social status of various groups was relatively independent of the social status of the perceiver.

Figure 1. Perceived social status of six Dominican "racial" groups
(high numbers indicating high social status).

Table II. Planned Comparisons of Perceived Social Status Between "Adjacent" "Racial" Categories

Contrast	F	p
Blanco vs. Trigueño	18.6	10^{-3}
Trigueño vs. Indio	4.15	.04
Indio vs. Mulatto	11.78	10^{-3}
Mulatto vs. Moreno	38.68	10^{-7}
Moreno vs. Negro	6.80	.01

To illustrate the nature of this cross-group consensus in the simplest possible manner, we further classified the respondents into one of three large "racial" categories: "Euros" (i.e., "Blancos"; $n = 73$), "Mixed" (i.e., "Trigueños" and "Indios"; $n = 88$), and "Afros" (i.e., "Mulattos," "Morenos," and "Negros"; $n = 73$). We performed this classification on the basis of self-rated "racial" categorization (i.e., the interviewee self-classifications) as well as other-rated "racial" categorization (i.e., the interviewer classifications). Starting first with the self-rated or respondents' subjective self-classifications in Figure 2, we see that regardless of the respondents' own "racial" classification, they still placed the "racial" groups in the same general rank order. Dominicans of European background were rated as having relatively high social status, Dominicans of African background were rated as having low social status, and Dominicans in the four intermediate categories were perceived as having intermediate social status.

Figure 2. Perceived social status of six Dominican "racial" groups as a function of one's own "racial" classification. High numbers indicate high social status.

However, despite this cross-group consensus, there was still a slight interaction between target "race" and subject "race" [$F(10, 1125) = 2.97, p < .001, \eta = .17$]. The nature of this interaction suggested that there was still a slight tendency for people to favor their own "racial" group. This can be seen most clearly in the ratings by "Euros" versus those by "Afros" (see Figure 2). Although all three broad "racial" categories (i.e., "Euros," "Mixed," "Afros") tended to give "Blancos" higher social status than the other groups, "Euros" gave "Blancos" higher social status than did either "Mixed" or "Afros." Similarly, although there was broad overall consensus that "Negros" had lower social status than the other groups, "Afros" gave "Negros" higher social status than did either "Euros" or "Mixed." The same general trend was found when using the other-rated "racial" classifications. Here, there was a slightly smaller interaction between "race" of respondent and "race" of target [$F(10, 1125) = 2.05, p < .03, \eta = .14$].

To further support the notion that this group-based social hierarchy largely constituted a pigmentocracy, we computed two one-way ANOVAs in which each respondent's skin color was the dependent variable and the "racial" category was the independent variable. In the first analysis, the respondents' self-rated skin color was analyzed as a function of the respondent's self-rated "racial" category. In the second analysis, the respondent's other-rated skin color was analyzed as a function of the respondent's other-rated "racial" categorization. In both cases (see Figure 3), one's "racial" categorization was strongly related to one's perceived skin color. Although self-rated "racial" categorization was powerfully related to self-rated skin color [$F(5, 223) = 47.05, p < 10^{-10}, \eta = .72$], the relationship between

Figure 3. Self-rated and other-rated skin color as a function of self-rated and other-rated "racial" categorization.

other-rated "racial" categorization and other-rated skin color appears to be even more powerfully related [$F(5, 226) = 424.44, p < 10^{-12}, \eta = .95$]. As the size of the generalized correlation coefficient suggests (i.e., $\eta = .95$), there is almost a perfect overlap between one's perceived skin color and classification into one of the six "racial" categories.

To explore the possibility that one's economic status and education might also contribute to one's "racial" categorization, we computed two stepwise multiple discriminant analyses in which classification into one of the six "racial" categories (both self-rated and other-rated) was modeled as being a function of skin color (self- and other-rated), economic class, and level of education. In both cases we examined the increase in classification accuracy into one the six "racial" categories that economic and educational status could add over and above the effects of skin color. In neither case could one's economic classification nor one's level of education make a significant contribution to one's "racial" classification over and above the effects of skin color.

In sum, there is strong reason to believe that one's "racial" classification is essentially determined by one's perceived skin color. This fact, together with the consensually agreed-upon status differences between these "racial" categories, appears to constitute prima facie evidence of a pigmentocracy, despite all claims of "racial" democracy and despite the very high level of "interracial" marriage.

The Interface Between Ethnic and National Attachment

If the earlier results from Israel and the United States are generalizable to the Dominican Republic, we should also expect to find an asymmetrical relationship between racial and national attachment. This asymmetry should express itself in at least three ways, as discussed above. First, the degree of patriotic commitment to the nation should increase as a function of racial status. Second, the relationship between national attachment and ethnocentrism should become systematically more positive as one moves up the racial status hierarchy. Third, we should find an asymmetrical relationship between national attachment and ideologies and values of group-based dominance. Thus, among dominants (i.e., "Blancos") there should be a significantly more positive correlation between Dominican patriotism and SDO or racism than among subordinates (i.e., "Negros").

We explored the first issue by examining Dominican patriotism as a function of each of the four indices of "racial" classification: self-rated "racial" categorization, other-rated "racial" categorization, self-rated skin color, and other-rated skin color. The results from these four analyses were all essentially the same. In each case—contrary to the predictions of the exclusionary patriotism hypothesis and previous results from Israel and the United States—there was no relationship between "racial" classification and level of patriotism ($F < 1$ in all four cases). Not only were the patriotism levels essentially the same for all six "racial" groups, but there was not even a coherent trend congruent with these findings (see Table III).

We examined the second feature of the asymmetry hypothesis by regressing patriotism on indices of racial identity, group affect toward each of the six "races," ethnocentrism, and ideologies of group-based dominance (see Table IV). Beginning with the relationships between patriotism and racial identity (Table IV, panel A), contrary to previous findings in the United States and Israel and the exclusionary patriotism hypothesis, there were no systematic relationships of any kind between Dominican patriotism and the three indices of racial identity (i.e., "racial" identity,

Table III. Means and Standard Deviations of Patriotism as a Function of Self-rated and Other-rated "Race" and Skin Color

Self-rated "Race"	Mean(sd)	Other-rated "Race"	Mean(sd)	Self-rated Skin color	Mean(sd)	Other-rated Skin color	Mean(sd)
Blanco	5.57(.61)	Blanco	5.61(.65)	Very light	5.51(.75)	Very light	5.74(.56)
Trigueño	5.58(.82)	Trigueño	5.68(.72)	Light	5.77(.46)	Light	5.67(.90)
Indio	5.71(.58)	Indio	5.76(.55)	Somewhat light	5.64(.77)	Somewhat light	5.61(.73)
Mulatto	5.56(.78)	Mulatto	5.52(.87)	Somewhat dark	5.55(.91)	Somewhat dark	5.61(.73)
Moreno	5.47(1.1)	Moreno	5.69(.83)	Dark	5.71(.60)	Dark	5.55(.67)
Negro	5.75(.46)	Negro	5.66(.63)	Very dark	5.76(.46)	Very dark	5.98(.09)

Table IV. Patriotism Regressed upon SDO, Legitimizing Ideologies, Racial Identity and Racial Affect as a Function of "Race"

Variable	"Racial" category						
	Blanco	Trigueño	Indio	Mulatto	Moreno	Negro	Total sample
Panel A: Patriotism Regressed on Racial Identity							
"Racial" Identity	−.08	.15	.16	.08	.16	.56	.03
Perceived degree of own African Heritage	−.03	−.07	−.04	.10	.18	.05	−.02
Perceived degree of African Heritage of Dominicans in General	−.02	−.09	.01	.00	.03	.01	−.02
Panel B: Patriotism Regressed on Racial Affect							
Blancos	.17*	.05	.05	−.07	.92	.06	.05
Trigueños	.26*	−.06	.22*	−.03	.14	.09	.09
Indios	.25*	−.11	.30**	.06	.34	.31	.17**
Mulattos	.17*	−.06	.10	.09	.74*	.31	.12*
Morenos	.13*	.09	.15	.08	.32	.31	.09*
Negros	.08	−.09	.13	.12	.25	.28	.08*
Haitians	.04	.03	.03	−.02	.13	−.01	.04
Panel C: Patriotism Regressed on Ethnocentrism							
Blancos	—	−.09	.08	.13	.13	−.05	.05
Trigueños	−.10	—	.17	.15	1.04	−.05	.12
Indios	−.11	.22	—	.06	−.56	−.27	−.04
Mulattos	−.12	.08	.02	—	−.12	−.27	−.03
Morenos	−.13	−.12	.02	.06	—	−.27	−.02
Negros	−.09	.11	−.04	−.46	−.38	—	−.03
Haitians	−.00	−.00	.01	.00	−.06	.04	−.01
Panel D: Patriotism Regressed on Ideologies of Group Dominance							
SDO	−.29**	−.27	.06	−.03	−.72*	.12	−.14*
Racism	−.13	−.01	−.17	.13	−.28	.07	−.09

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$
Note. All entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.

perceived degree of own African heritage, and perceived degree of African heritage of Dominicans in general). Even more important, this lack of relationship did not systematically vary across the racial hierarchy. Thus, the relationship between patriotism and racial identity was essentially zero, regardless of one's "racial" category.

Although there were no relationships between patriotism and indices of racial identity for any "racial" group, there were some relations between patriotism and affect toward different "racial" groups (Table IV, panel B). However, even these relationships were essentially inconsistent with the asymmetry hypothesis. To the

extent that Dominican patriotism was associated with affect toward racial sub-groups at all, these correlations were all positive and *none* of them were negative. For example, among the high-status "Blancos," rather than Dominican patriotism being positively associated with affect toward "Blancos" and negatively associated with affect toward "Negros," patriotism tended to be mildly yet significantly associated with *positive* affect toward all of the mixed races (i.e., Trigueños, Indios, Mulattos, and Morenos: $b = .26$, $b = .25$, $b = .17$, and $b = .13$, respectively, $p < .05$; see Table IV, panel B). Furthermore, there was no evidence of any systematic difference in the nature of these relationships between different racial categories. Thus, for the entire sample (panel B, last column), Dominican patriotism tended to be associated with positive affect toward *all* of the constituents of the Dominican nation, including the minorities at the very bottom of the "racial" hierarchy (Morenos and Negros; $b = .09$ and $.08$, respectively; $p < .05$). Not only did Dominican patriotism fail to be negatively related to affect toward other Dominican "races," it is also noteworthy that it failed to be negatively related to affect toward Haitians as well, regardless of the "racial" group that one belonged to. Thus, there is no evidence that Dominican patriotism increased the more one disliked Haitians.

Panel C of Table IV shows the relationships between Dominican patriotism and ethnocentrism. Earlier we had defined "ethnocentrism" as the difference in the affective response to one's own "race" relative to the affect felt toward other "races"; the more positive this number, the greater one's racial bias or ethnocentrism. In contrast to findings in the United States and Israel, none of these relationships were found to be significantly different from 0.00 for any "racial" group. This implies that Dominican patriotism is not associated with racial bias toward any racial category, regardless of one's own "race." Moreover, this lack of a relationship between Dominican patriotism and ethnocentrism held not only with respect to ethnocentrism toward other Dominican "races," but also with respect to ethnocentric bias toward Haitians.[5]

Finally, panel D of Table IV shows the relationships between Dominican patriotism and ideologies of group and racial dominance (i.e., SDO and anti-black racism) within each of the six "racial" categories and the total sample. To the extent that there was any association at all between Dominican patriotism and ideologies of group dominance (i.e., SDO and anti-black racism), these relationships tended to be *negative* rather than positive.[6] Once again, these findings are in contrast to

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[5] Here, ethnocentric bias toward Haitians was defined as the average affect felt toward all six Dominican groups minus the affect felt toward Haitians.

[6] One of the reviewers argued that these racism results might be due to the specific manner in which we operationalized the construct of "racism." That is, reactions to dark-skinned Dominicans and Haitians might compose two substantively distinctive dimensions. We took two steps to explore this possibility. First, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on the four-item racism scale and found that all four items clearly defined a unidimensional scale with a high goodness of fit ($\chi^2 = 0.50$, $p < .48$; AGFI = .99). Second, we repeated the analyses in Table 4 using two separate racism subscales, one based on respondents' reactions to dark-skinned Dominicans and the other based on respondents'

our results in the United States and Israel. It is at least possible to understand the negative correlation between anti-black racism and Dominican patriotism by simply recognizing the fact that most Dominicans have some black heritage. However, Dominican patriotism had a negative correlation not only with anti-black racism ($b = -.09$, $p < .05$), but also with generalized support for group-based hierarchy and anti-egalitarianism. That is, the more patriotic Dominican respondents were, the *less* likely they were to endorse SDO ($b = -.14$ within the total sample). There was not a single case within any "race" in which patriotism was significantly and *positively* correlated with SDO. These results stand in stark contrast to findings in the United States, where American patriotism was found to correlate positively with SDO among the Euro-Americans but negatively among Latino, African, and Asian Americans (Sidanius et al., 1997; Sidanius & Peña, 2000). Thus, in contrast to the U.S. findings, Dominican patriotism showed a distinctly inclusionary rather than exclusionary flavor among all "races."

Discussion

It is widely recognized that the construct of "race" in the Dominican Republic and other Latin American and Caribbean nations is not nearly as dichotomous and absolute as it is in the Anglo-Saxon nations of North America (i.e., the United States and Canada). It is also true that the degree of racial intermarriage and miscegenation between those with European and African ancestry in the Dominican Republic is among the highest in all of Latin America and perhaps the modern world. Despite this high level of "racial" intermarriage and the polychromatic character of many Dominican families (see Torres-Saillant, 1998a), we found unambiguous evidence of a socially constructed, pigment-based social hierarchy.

Dominicans are apparently able to make reliable status differentiations among people with very subtle phenotypic "racial" differences. Furthermore, these subtle distinctions in skin color, and perhaps other phenotypic features (e.g., hair texture), arrange themselves in a clear and consensually agreed-upon hierarchical pattern. Although there was a very slight tendency for people to give higher status ratings to their own "racial" category, this trend toward ethnocentrism was clearly overwhelmed by cross-"racial" consensus. Thus, all claims of "racial democracy" and Iberian exceptionalism aside, there is strong and nearly universal agreement that it is better to be European than African in appearance; the more European, the better. Clearly, then, and consistent with the social dominance perspective (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), even a very high level of miscegenation is no antidote against continued race-based social hierarchy.

Although the existence of a clear and consensually structured racial hierarchy or "pigmentocracy" undermines notions of racial democracy and Iberian

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reactions to Haitians. The results of these analyses did not differ in any substantial manner from the results in Table 4 based on the four-item racism scale.

exceptionalism, there are other findings here that give some support to this thesis. Despite pigmentocracy and the fact that social discourses around the construct of *Dominicanidad* and "authentic Dominicanness" contain powerful and consistent Europhilic and Afrophobic elements (see, e.g., Torres-Saillant, 1999), there was simply no evidence consistent with an asymmetrical and exclusionary interface between racial and national attachment. In stark contrast to our findings in the United States and Israel, patriotic attachment to the nation did not differ by "racial" category, nor was it positively associated with either Europhilic or Afrophobic tendencies within any "racial" category. If anything, patriotic attachment to the nation was positively rather than negatively associated with affect toward the middle- and low-ranked "racial" status categories. In addition, to the extent that patriotic attachment to the nation was positively associated with ideologies and values of group-based dominance (e.g., SDO, anti-black racism), these associations tended to be *negative* rather than positive.

At first blush, it seems quite plausible that the intersection between patriotism and group affect found in the United States, Israel, and this Dominican sample could be simply understood in terms of which "races" represent the majority and minority of the population within each country. That is, a finding that patriotism is associated with positive affect toward whites in the United States, Jews in Israel, and non-whites in the Dominican Republic is simply a result of these groups constituting the majority within each nation. This interpretation seems quite consistent with the data on affect toward the majority groups, but it is not so easily applied with respect to the minority groups. Sidanius et al. (1997) and Sidanius and Petrocik (in press) found that patriotism within both the United States and Israel was associated with ethnocentric rejection of the minority groups within these nations (i.e., blacks and Israeli Arabs, respectively). If this simple majority/ minority rule were easily applicable to the Dominican Republic as well, we should also expect Dominican patriotism to be associated with ethnocentric rejection of the minority group (i.e., whites). However, this was clearly not the case. Table 4 shows that there was no evidence of Dominican patriotism being associated with ethnocentric rejection of or negative affect toward *any* Dominican ethnic group, including whites (i.e., Blancos), regardless of the "race" of the perceiver. In other words, in contrast to results from the United States (Sidanius et al., 1997; Sidanius & Peña, 2000; Sidanius & Petrocik, in press), Israel (Sidanius et al., 1997) and, one suspects, the former Yugoslavia (Hayden, 1993), there was no evidence of exclusionary patriotism in the Dominican Republic. On the contrary, for both Dominican dominants and subordinates, to the extent that Dominican patriotism was related to ethnocentric bias or anti-egalitarianism at all, this patriotism appeared to be an inclusionary and counter-dominance project.

Together, then, these Dominican data present an intriguing picture. The results are partially consistent with the Iberian exceptionalism argument, but they are also partly consistent with the social dominance perspective. Even in the highly miscegenated nation of the Dominican Republic, race still matters and forms the basis

of a highly consensual group-based hierarchy. However, this racial hierarchy does not necessarily imply asymmetry in the interface between racial and national attachment. Clearly, then, and as suggested by Sinclair et al. (1998), the precise interface between ethnic/racial and national attachment does appear to depend on context.

In addition, this notion of context dependency also gives us some room to affirm a limited validity for the Iberian exceptionalism thesis (Freyre, 1951). Even though a highly calibrated and socially constructed concept of race plays an important role in the allocation of status and political power within Dominican society (see also Howard, 1999; Pons, 1981; Torres-Saillant, 1999), in the continuing Europhilic and Afrophobic discourse concerning the construct of *Dominicanidad*, and in the relatively recent efforts to "whiten" the nation through the selective immigration of whites (see Torres-Saillant, 1999), the existence of this pigmentocracy does not appear to reflect itself in an asymmetrical interface between racial and national attachment—unlike the situation in the United States. It appears that researchers such as Hanchard, Marx, Nobles, and Wade are correct. What is exceptional about the Iberian style of race relations is the hegemonic ideal that all citizens, regardless of race, are "truly Dominican." It appears that the myth of racial democracy (as Hanchard and others have called it) is a powerful one indeed, and that it exists on top of a well-defined and consensually held racial hierarchy based on skin color.

Thus, Dominican society would seem to have pulled off a rather neat trick. It has maintained a clear and consensually held pigmentocracy, while at the same time giving each of the "pigment categories" an equal sense of commitment and attachment to the nation as a whole. Furthermore, this commitment to the nation is positively associated with affective response to the racially subordinate categories. In other words, what we appear to be faced with in the Dominican Republic is a form of *inclusionary discrimination*. Although there is clear evidence of race-based hierarchy in the Dominican Republic, this hierarchy is evidently not quite "severe" enough to express itself as exclusionary patriotism. The question then becomes, of course, "How severe must the group-based social hierarchy become before asymmetry and exclusionary patriotism begin to emerge?"

Although no simple or straightforward answer to this question seems to be derivable from any of the current dominance theories (e.g., group positions theory, realistic group conflict theory, system justification theory, social dominance theory), one general approach to answering this question might be offered by classical social identity theory (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social identity theory suggests that when group boundaries are relatively porous and cross-group individual mobility is possible, people will attempt to achieve positive self-regard by switching group membership from low-status to high-status groups. Similar to what appears to be happening in Brazil, miscegenation within the Dominican Republic appears to offer what has been referred to as the "Mulatto escape hatch" (see Degler, 1986). Even though "marrying up" in the pigmentocracy will have only a relatively

limited effect on the social status of the low-status spouse, it will have a substantial effect on the social status of the offspring.

Seen from this perspective, miscegenation not only offers a means of individual and intergenerational social mobility and a means of promoting a common and superordinate sense of common identity, it might also offer a means of maintaining the basic integrity and stability of the race-based social hierarchy by retarding the possibility of group-based collective action by members of low-status groups. In other words, rather than being a mechanism for the elimination of group-based social hierarchy, miscegenation may operate as a means of *reinforcing and stabilizing* group-based social hierarchy (for similar but not identical reasoning, see Banton, 1967; Hanchard, 1994; Skidmore, 1974; Wade, 1997). Thus, in contrast to the conclusions one might reach based on findings from Israel and the United States, these findings from the Dominican Republic suggest that group-based racial hierarchy does not necessarily imply an asymmetrical relationship between racial and national attachment. These Dominican results suggest that group-based social inequality and ethnic/national symmetry are actually quite compatible.

However, we must still treat these data with a certain degree of caution. Our data probably represent one of the best samples measuring these variables within the Dominican Republic, yet the sample is somewhat limited. Unlike the evidence explored by Sidanius et al. (1997), Sidanius and Petrocik (in press), or Sidanius and Peña (2000), these Dominican data do not constitute either a national or regional probability sample. Among other things, the sample was based exclusively on residents in the capital city of Santo Domingo. Therefore, firm conclusions should not be drawn until these basic findings have been replicated with a sample more representative of the nation as a whole.

Thus, keeping all of these caveats in mind, there is reason to believe that the contextual differences between the United States and Israel on the one hand, and the Dominican Republic on the other hand, really do make a difference in the results of interest here. However, it is still far from clear exactly how these contextual differences make a difference. Is it the relative strength of hierarchy-enhancing or egalitarian social values, the presence of some inclusionary and religious or political ideology (e.g., Catholicism, myth of racial democracy), the level of miscegenation, or some combination of these and other factors? High intergroup miscegenation may indeed be a key parameter in determining when asymmetry between ethnic and national attachment will or will not be found within hierarchically organized societies, but further research will be necessary to clarify the importance of this factor (if any) relative to other potentially important factors.

Moreover, even if miscegenation does reveal itself to be an important parameter in promoting a symmetrical racial/nationality interface, we still need to know just "how much" miscegenation must occur before this symmetry occurs, and to what degree ideology matters. For example, the rate of intermarriage between various ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia was not as high as is popularly believed, but this intermarriage rate was still far from trivial and substantially

higher than that found between blacks and whites in the United States (Botev & Wagner, 1993). However, it was not sufficient to prevent the outbreak of ferocious levels of exclusionary patriotism and interethnic carnage in Yugoslavia. All of this is simply to say, of course, that a great deal more cross-cultural research will be necessary before we are even close to understanding the exact circumstances under which exclusionary patriotism will and will not occur. It is our hope that this paper will help contribute to further cross-cultural research concerning the complex and critically important interface between ethnic and national attachment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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